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19681

M.I.D.F.A. v.

HELFRICH

State Aid To Industrial Development
And The "Credit Clause"
Maryland Industrial Development Financing
Authority v. Helfrich'
The Maryland Industrial Development Financing Authority Act'
was enacted to assist local non-profit development corporations and
municipalities in their efforts to stimulate industrial expansion and
diversification in their respective communities.' The Act contemplates
that municipalities,4 counties or local development corporations" purchase and improve industrial properties, financing the project through
first mortgages from private financial institutions, and then lease the
sites to new or relocating industrial concerns. The lessor derives no
profit from the leasing arrangement; the rent paid by the industrial
lessee is calculated almost exclusively by the payments due on the
mortgage. 6 All mortgages executed pursuant to the Act must contain
provisions for complete amortization within the initial term of the
lease,' and may not exceed ninety per cent of the cost of the project
or seventy per cent of the cost of machinery or equipment. 8 The remaining costs are apparently provided by the lessee.9 At the end of the
lease and mortgage term, as a matter of practice, the lessee either

MD.

1. 250 Md. 602, 243 A.2d 869 (1968).
2. MD. ANN. Cone art. 41, §§ 266J-266CC (Supp. 1967), amending in part
ANN. CoD art. 41, §§ 266J-266CC (1965).
3. MD. ANN. CoDs art. 41,

§ 266K (1965).

4. Municipality is defined as any municipal corporation under the provisions of
Article XI-E of the Maryland Constitution, and also includes the Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore City. MD. ANN. CODs art. 41, § 266-0(10) (Supp. 1967).
5. Local development corporation is defined as ". . . any corporation or foundation no part of the net earnings of such [which] inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual organized and operated primarily for the purposes of
fostering, encouraging and assisting the physical location and settlement of industrial
and manufacturing enterprises within the State or promoting the industry of the State."
MD. ANN. CoDS art. 41, § 266-0(4) (Supp. 1967).
6. Record Extract at 69-70, Maryland Indus. Dev. Financing Authority v.
Helfrich, 250 Md. 602, 243 A.2d 869 (1968).
7. MD. ANN. CODe art. 41, §§ 266T(4) and (6) (1965).
8. MD. ANN. CODn art. 41, § 266T(2) (1965).
9. Brief for Appellee & Cross-appellant at 5, Maryland Indus. Dev. Financing
Authority v. Helfrich, 250 Md. 602, 243 A.2d 869 (1968).
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automatically obtains title to the site or is allowed to purchase title for
a nominal consideration.'" The impetus of the plan comes from the fact
that the Act authorizes the Maryland Industrial Development Financing Authority (the Authority) to insure the payment of the mortgage
loans and, in Section 266L, to pledge the faith and credit of the state
to that end." The mortgagor, because the mortgage is guaranteed
by the state, is able to obtain a loan at a rate of interest considerably
less than that available for uninsured mortgages, and, since the mortgagor derives no profit from the lease, this saving is passed on to the
industrial tenant in the form of lower rental charges. All expenses
of the Authority, such as mortgage payments required by loan defaults,
are drawn from a non-lapsing, revolving mortgage insurance fund 2
established by annual appropriations."8 If, however, the reserves of
the mortgage insurance fund are inadequate, Section 266Z' 4 of the
Act provides that the Board of Public Works must either provide
additional money from its emergency fund or issue a state loan of
sufficient size to meet the obligations of the Authority.'"
The Act is patterned after the so-called "New England" plan'
for industrial development and represents a major departure from the
industrial development plans previously adopted by many southern
10. Record Extract at 27-28, 63, Maryland Indus. Dev. Financing Authority v.
Helfrich, 250 Md. 602, 243 A.2d 869 (1968).
11. MD. ANN. COD- art. 41, § 266L (Supp. 1967): "The Maryland Industrial
Development Financing Authority is authorized to insure the payment of mortgage
loans secured by industrial projects, and to this end the faith and credit of the State
are hereby pledged to the extent of thirty million dollars ($30,000,000.)."
12. MD. ANN. COD4 art 41, § 266S (Supp. 1967).
13. MD. ANN. CODx art 41, § 266BB (1965).
14. MD. ANN. CODs art. 41, § 266Z (Supp. 1967):
(a) Request to Board of Public Works. - If from time to time in the opinion
of the Authority the addition of moneys to the mortgage insurance fund shall be
required, the Authority in writing shall request the Board of Public Works to
provide sufficient moneys to maintain its reserve at a level deemed adequate by
the Authority, and upon receipt of such request, said Board may pay over the
amount so requested from its emergency fund.
(b) Issuance of State loan; maximum amount. - In the event the Board of
Public Works does not have sufficient funds available to meet the request or elects
not to make payment from the emergency fund, the Board shall issue a State loan
in the amount sufficient to meet all obligations undertaken by the Authority in
the insurance of mortgages pursuant to this subtitle . . . not to exceed in the
aggregate the sum of thirty million dollars ($30,000,000.).
15. § 266L as originally enacted, ch. 714, [1965] Md. Laws 1031, read: "The
Mdryland Industrial Development Financing Authority is authorized to insure the
payment of mortgage loans secured by industrial projects, and to this end the faith
and credit of the State are hereby pledged, consistent with the terms and limitations
of the terms of this subtitle." § 266Z as originally enacted, ch. 714, [1965] Md. Laws
1038, provided: "If from time to time in the opinion of the Authority the addition of
moneys to the mortgage insurance fund is required to meet obligations, the Authority
in writing shall request the Governor to provide sufficient moneys for this purpose.
The Governor may submit this request to the next regular session of the General
Assembly, as an item of appropriation in the budget bill." Maryland Indus. Dev.
Financing Authority v. Meadow-Croft, 243 Md. 515, 221 A.2d 632 (1966), held that
§ 266L was invalid as a pledge of credit because § 266Z did not make the necessary
appropriation mandatory. The language of the original sections was amended to cure
that defect. See MD. ANN. CODS art. 41, §§ 266L, 266Z (Supp. 1967), quoted notes
11 & 14 supra.
16. Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An
Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. Rev. 265, 270 (1963).
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states. Under the earlier programs, municipalities were authorized
to finance the purchase of industrial sites through the issuance of
general obligation bonds or revenue bonds,' 7 and, in turn, lease the
facilities to private industries. Rental payments were calculated to
amortize the bond issue within a predetermined period. Because the
municipal bonds pledged the taxing power of the municipality and
were exempt from federal' and, in some instances, state taxation, 19
they were easily marketed at relatively low interest rates. The result,
similar to that contemplated by the Maryland scheme, was that the
lessee was able to obtain title to an industrial site at a substantially
lower cost than if he were to lease or purchase the facility from private
owners. The differences between the approach to industrial development characterized by the Maryland Act and that of the bond financed
plans are significant.2 0 The bond programs originally sought to overcome an insufficiency of private capital with public funds. The Maryland plan, through the use of the state's credit, seeks to encourage
investment from established private sources. Projects financed under
the bond programs rest on the relatively narrow municipal tax base,
so that a single default can have a serious effect on the finances of the
issuing municipality. Maryland's scheme, however, because it rests
on the broad credit base of the state, is potentially more stable. Finally,
state and federal tax exemptions play a vital role in the bond programs ;21 under the plan embodied in the Maryland Act, the effect of
tax exemptions is little more than incidental, a feature of some importance in light of recent amendments to the Internal Revenue Code
17. General obligation bonds are payable from general ad valorem taxes and are
debts for which the municipality is primarily liable. E.g., DeLoach v. Scheper, 188
S.C. 21, 198 S.E. 409 (1938). The first modern industrial development program,
Mississippi's Balance Agriculture with Industry Act, was based on the issuance of
this type of bond. Ch. 241, §§ 1-7, [1944] Miss. Laws 418-28, now codified as Miss.

Cong

ANN.

§§ 8936 to 8940-69 (1956 & 1966 Supp.). See generally Bell, Legal

Problems That May Be Encountered in the Administration of Mississippi's BAWI

Program, 29 Miss. L.J. 22 (1957). Similar plans have been enacted in at least six
other jurisdictions. Pinsky, supra note 16, at 268 n.14.
A variation on the use of general obligation bonds has found favor since the
late 1950's. Pursuant to Oklahoma's industrial development plan, the proceeds of
general obligation bonds are used to make second mortgage loans directly to industrial
development corporations. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 856 (1965 & Supp. 1968).
See also MD.ANN. CODE art. 45A, §§ 1-3 (1965); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. §§ 162-A :1
to 162-A:16 (1964); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1800-34. (McKinney Supp. 1968).
Revenue bonds are payable solely from revenues derived from the project to
be financed. E.g., Britt v. City of Wilmington, 236 N.C. 446, 73 S.E.2d 289 (1952).
Industrial development plans employing revenue bond financing have been enacted in
at least fifteen jurisdictions, predominantly in the south. Pinsky, supra note 16,
at 326-27. Revenue bonds do not pledge the state's credit. Basemore v. Haden Indus.
Dev. Authority, 37 U.S.L.W. 2325 (Pa. Nov. 22, 1968).
See generally Abbey, Municipal Industrial Development Bonds, 19 VAND. L.

Rgv. 25 (1965) ; Comment, Financing Industrial Development with Municipal Revenue

Bonds, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 331; Note, The Proliferation of Industrial Revenue Bond
Financing: Ban the Bond?, 41 TEMP. L.Q. 289 (1968) ; Note, Incentives to Industrial
Relocation: The Municipal Industrial Bond Plans, 66 HARV. L. Riv. 898 (1953).
18. INT. REv. COD of 1954, § 103(a) (1). But see note 22 infra.
19. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 13-1610 (Supp. 1967) ; Miss. CODg ANN. § 8936-66

(Supp. 1966) ; N.D. CENT. CODg ANN. § 40-57-13 (Supp. 1967).
20. See Pinsky, supra note 16, at 271.

21. See Armstrong, "Municipal Inducements" - The New Mexico Commercial
and Industrial Project Revenue Bond Act, 48 CALP. L. Rgv. 58 (1960).
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limiting the federal tax exemption for interest on industrial development bonds. 2
Maryland Industrial Development Financing Authority v. Helfrich23 was a taxpayer's suit brought against the Authority to enjoin
all activities authorized by the Act and to obtain a declaratory judgment holding the Act, the transactions of the Authority and specifically
sections 266L and 266Z of the Act to be unconstitutionally void on
the theory that they violated Article III, Section 34 of the Constitution of Maryland, the so-called "credit clause." The "credit clause"
provides that: "The credit of the State shall not in any manner be
given, or loaned to, or in aid of any individual association or corporation; nor shall the General Assembly have the power in any mode to
involve the State in the construction of works of internal improvement,
nor in granting any aid thereto which shall involve the faith or credit
of the State .

. . ."

The Circuit Court of Baltimore City granted the

requested relief, declaring unconstitutional the portions of the Act
which were offensive to the credit clause, Sections 266L, 266Z(b)
through (i), and the second sentence of Section 266Z(k). 24 Section
266L, the court reasoned, was clearly unconstitutional because it expressly pledged the credit of the state. The specific subsections of
Section 266Z, the funding section of the Act, were declared unconstitutional under two distinct theories. If those subsections were interpreted as implementing the pledge of credit contained in Section 266L,
they would fall with that section. If, however, the subsections were
severable, they would still be unconstitutional because they would in
themselves constitute an unlawful pledge of the state's credit. 5 The
Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed, concluding: "[W]e will not
construe the faith and credit clause of the Constitution to mean less
than it says, and it is our view that § 266L's attempt to pledge the
State's faith and credit to the guaranty of mortgages .. .is unconsti-

tutional and void."26 The court rested its decision on Development
Credit Corp. v. McKean,2 7 decided by the Court of Appeals earlier in
1968, which rendered unconstitutional as a violation of the credit clause
an industrial development plan similar to the Act in purpose, but
2
different in its operation.

8

22. INT. RAV. CODE of 1954, § 103(c) removes the federal exemption on income
from industrial development bonds which are part of a total issue of more than
$1,000,000 and which are issued after January 1, 1969.
23. 250 Md. 602, 243 A.2d 869 (1968).
24. No. 108-A (Cir. Ct. Balto. City, filed June 19, 1968).
25. The court reasoned that § 266Z (b), although it was phrased merely as an
authority to create a debt, contained a mandatory requirement that the Board of Public
Works issue state bonds to pay the obligations of the Authority, if sufficient funds
were not otherwise available, and, thus, obligated the state to undertake a constitutionally prohibited suretyship liability.
26. 250 Md. at 617, 243 A.2d at 877.
27. 248 Md. 572, 237 A.2d 742 (1968).
28. MD. ANN. COD art. 23, §§ 412-29 (1965), established the Development Credit
Corporation and authorized it to insure mortgage loans secured by industrial projects.
The Corporation financed this function by issuing its own bonds and notes which were
secured by a pledge of the state's credit. The Corporation was run by a private board
of directors elected by shareholders and made loans directly to corporations or individuals engaged in a wide range of economic activities.
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Industrial development plans have traditionally met two obstructions: the "public purpose" doctrine, which requires that all public
expenditures or loans of credit be for public purposes, 29 and state constitutional provisions restricting the state's ability to pledge its credit.8"
Helfrich is illustrative of the latter and more formidable barrier. Two
distinct issues are raised by the Helfrich court's interpretation of the
Act and by its particular view of the credit clause of the Maryland
Constitution: (1) What forms of state aid to industrial development
involve a pledge of the state's credit; and (2) Which types of industrial aid which do involve a pledge of credit actually violate the credit
clause contained in the Maryland Constitution?
29. The public purpose doctrine was, in effect, a judicial response to the same
financial catastrophes of the railroad bond era of 1830-1840 which were the original
motivation for the state constitutional debt limitations. See note 30 infra. The doctrine was first enunciated in Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853),
a suit involving the city's subscription to railroad stock, financed through the sale of
municipal bonds. Though the court validated the subscription, it noted that it was
implicit in the state constitution that taxes could be levied only for public purposes.
Similar decisions have followed in every jurisdiction.
The doctrine was followed by the Supreme Court in Citizen's Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875) ; accord, Parkersburg v. Brown,
106 U.S. 487 (1883); Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885). The constitutional
source of the restriction, because of the broad language of Topeka, was thought to
reside in the fourteenth amendment. Contra, Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard
Mining Co., 116 U.S. 239, 257 (1905) (dissent). Although these decisions have never
been specifically overruled, recent decisions indicate that the Court's present policy is
to leave to the states the question of whether a given project constitutes a public
purpose. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) ; Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937) ; Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920).
The states' application of the public purpose test to industrial development
plans has been varied. Those courts which uphold the plans usually do so on variations
of the "private means to public ends" rationale stressed in the first case to consider
the question, Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938), appeal
dismissed per curiam, 303 U.S. 627 (1938). The Albritton court reasoned that it is
the proper function of government to relieve unemployment and alleviate poverty and
that to this end the state can either use tax funds directly or create opportunities for
employment itself; therefore, if the state chooses the latter alternative and constructs
municipally owned plants, there should be no objection to its engaging the assistance
of private industry in operating the plant. Incidental benefits to private corporations
are seen as being outweighed by the public benefit of industrialization. Other jurisdictions have reached contrary decisions, refusing to accept the Albritton arguments.
State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1962) ; State ex rel. Beck v. City
of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957).
The leading Maryland case to adopt the doctrine that public funds must be
expended for public purposes was Baltimore & E.S.R. Co. v. Spring, 80 Md. 510,
31 A. 208 (1895). The doctrine has suffered gradual erosion, however, as indicated
by language in Finan v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberland, 154 Md. 536, 565,
141 A. 269, 270 (1928): "What is a public purpose for which public funds may be
expended is not a matter of exact definition; it is almost entirely a matter of general
acceptation." Of particular importance is City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 215 Md. 9,
136 A.2d 852 (1957), which upheld the sale of municipal bonds to assist the financing
of the construction of a manufacturing concern. The only declaration of public purpose
in the legislation was that its intent was to encourage industrial development. The
court noted that incidental benefits to private industries are not fatal, if there are
substantial public benefits. Id. at 18-19, 136 A.2d at 856. See generally Pinsky, supra
note 16; Note, The "Public Purpose" of Municipal Financing for Industrial Development, 70 YALs L.J. 789 (1961).
30. The state constitutional limitations which currently restrict the use of state
credit arose in response to the period of extreme public spending known as the
railroad bond era. During the 18 30's and 40's it became common for state governments to assist private rail and canal companies by using the proceeds of state bond
issues to purchase private stocks. The trend was partly attributable to the insufficiency of available private capital but probably would not have occurred had
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A

GRANT

OF

STATE FUNDS

VERSUS

A

PLEDGE

OF THE STATE'S CREDIT

The Helfrich court rested its decision directly on Development
Credit Corp. v. McKean,"' which involved the issuance of mortgage
loans directly to private industrial concerns. In McKean the court
noted a distinction between a grant of funds involving the creation of
a debt for which the state is primarily liable and a pledge or loan of
the state's credit in guarantee of the debts of another. It concluded
that the former was not prohibited by the credit clause, whereas the
latter, which characterized the mechanism of the Development Credit
Corporation, was a violation. This distinction was first drawn in
Maryland in Johns Hopkins University v. Williams.32 Hopkins involved the constitutionality of a state bond issue, the proceeds of
which were to be donated to the University for the construction of a
school of engineering. The court discussed the historical purposes
of the credit clause and concluded that what was originally intended
by the framers of the clause was to prohibit only suretyship obligations and not direct donations of funds. The language in Grout v.
Kendall,3 cited with approval in Hopkins, is particularly lucid:
What is meant herein by a loan of 'credit'? When one signs
an accommodation note and delivers it to his neighbor, he loans
his credit to his neighbor. .

.

. When one becomes surety for his

neighbor and signs his promissory notes to third parties he loans
his credit. .

.

. The liability of the surety is always secondary,

not primary. It is a liability for the debt of another which such
other is bound to pay. And herein is the delusion of suretyship.
The surety assumes a secondary liability in the optimistic assurance and belief always that the primary debtor will pay, and that
he will never be required to perform the obligation ....
It was to
remove this delusion of suretyship, with its snare of temptation
that this section of the constitution was adopted. . . . It does not
purport to deal with 8the
creation of a primary indebtedness for
any purpose whatever. 4
there not been a rather well defined sentiment that these public improvements, being
a source of future revenue and generally desired by the populace, were a proper
function of state governments. During the late 1830's public borrowing reached unprecedented proportions, exceeding $190,000,000 by 1841. The depressions of 1839 and
1840 however, brought about the demise of most internal improvement projects and
precipitated a wave of state defaults. See generally A. HEINS, CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE DEBr 1-13 (1963) ; H. SECRIST, AN EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS UPON PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS

IN THE UNITED

STATES (1914) ; C. WRIGHT, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 234-412 (1949).
Maryland was hardly immune from the financial crisis. In 1840 the State's
debt exceeded fifteen million dollars, less than two per cent of which was incurred
for purposes other than internal improvement. The increasing costs and diminishing
revenues of such projects as the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal and the Baltimore and
Susquehanna Railroad forced the suspension of interest payments for 1842 and for the
following six years. H. HANNA, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MARYLAND 79-105 (1907).

31. 248 Md. 572, 237 A.2d 742 (1968).
32. 199 Md. 382, 86 A.2d 892 (1952).

33. 195 Iowa 467, 192 N.W. 529 (1923).

34. Id. at 472, 192 N.W. at 531. Also cited in Hopkins for the same proposition

were: Bush v. Martineau, 174 Ark. 214, 295 S.W. 9 (1927); Hagler v. Small, 307
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The Hopkins court adopted this rationale and applied it to the interpretation of Maryland's credit clause:
Cash is not credit. Credit is sometimes a means of procuring cash
but the word is never used to describe a gift of cash. There is no
prohibition in the Constitution against making appropriations to
private institutions, provided the purpose is public, or semi-public,
and thousands of dollars are appropriated out of the annual reIf the State does not have ...

ceipts every year ....

the necessary

amount available, but borrows it and then gives the cash to the
University . . . it is not giving or loaning its credit to, or in aid
of, the University. . ..

The rule that donations of state funds are not prohibited has been
extended to insulate loans of funds to private corporations in Maryland36 and other jurisdictions. Where the loan is made from cash on
hand, most jurisdictions have held that no prohibition exists3 and
where the loan is made from the proceeds of state bonds or other state
indebtedness, most states follow the reasoning in Hopkins. Industrial
Development Authority v. Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission 8 involved the loaning of state funds, obtained by direct appropriation, to local development corporations. The court upheld the loans
noting that ".

.

. the authority would not be giving or pledging or

lending the credit of the state because the authority would not be
undertaking to become a surety on ...

obligations in which the state's

money was invested." 3 9 In similar fashion Halbert v. Helena-West
Helena Industrial Development Corp.4 upheld state purchases of
bonds issued by development corporations. Several jurisdictions, however, have refused to adopt anything less than a literal interpretation of
the credit clause. In State ex rel. Saxbe v. Brand,4' the ability of the
state's development financing commission to make loans to private
industrial concerns was at issue. The court adopted the relatively
extreme position that ".

.

. those [constitutional] provisions prohibit

a giving or loaning of [the state's] credit even where no 'debts' of
the state, either 'direct or contingent' have been incurred."4 2 4ashington State Highway Commission v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone
Ill. 460, 138 N.E. 849 (1923) ; Gruen v. State Tax Comm'n, 35 Wash. 2d 1, 211 P.2d
651 (1949).
35. 199 Md. at 401, 86 A.2d at 901.
36. Truitt v. Board of Public Works, 243 Md. 375, 221 A.2d 370 (1966).
37. E.g., Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark. 57, 334 S.W.2d 633 (1960) ; Faulconer v.
City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80 (1950); West v. Industrial Dev. Bd.,
206 Tenn. 154, 332 S.W.2d 201 (1960). Contra, State ex rel. Beck v. City of York,
164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957) ; State v. Town of North Miami, 59 So. 2d 779
(Fla. 1952). But cf. Darnell v. County of Montgomery, 202 Tenn. 560, 308 S.W.2d
373 (1957).
38. 332 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1960).
39. Id. at 278. See also Andres v. First Ark. Dev. Financing Corp., 230 Ark. 594,
324 S.W.2d 97 (1959); Fairbanks v. Stratton, 14 Ill. 307, 152 N.E.2d 569 (1958).
40. 226 Ark. 620, 291 S.W.2d 802 (1956).
41. 176 Ohio 44, 197 N.E.2d 328 (1964).
42. 197 N.E.2d at 333.
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Co.43 held that state donations to a public utility to pay for the relocation of utility poles offended the credit clause of the Washington Constitution. Without considering any public purpose arguments, the court
concluded that legislative acts giving public funds or credit to individual
associations or corporations fell within the constitutional prohibition.
Despite these later decisions, it appears that the exclusion of
direct grants or loans of funds from the constitutional prohibition of
pledges of credit is the better reasoned rule. The critical factor is that
the amount of state liability incurred by the issuance of state bonds to
finance a grant or loan of funds is ascertainable, whereas a guarantee
of debts in the form of a suretyship obligation is a contingent liability
of uncertain amount, which might, of course, result in an unexpected
and severe burden on the state's finances. It is this uncertainty of
obligation which the Helfrich court found repugnant and which was
the basis of its decision: "The practical result of the provisions of the
Act is to substitute the State's continuing guaranty of obligations
which are indefinite in duration and uncertain in amount (except for
ceiling of $30,000,000) for a present appropriation of funds. '4 4
All other jurisdictions which have instituted industrial development
plans based on state guarantees of mortgages have either no specific
constitutional restriction on pledges of credit45 or have by constitutional
amendment provided for exception to the prohibition.46 States which
permit exception to the credit clause have nevertheless considered the
state guarantee to be a pledge of credit to the extent that they require
strict observance of the particular constitutional formalities required by
the credit clause exception. 47 The question remains, however, whether
the indefiniteness of obligation found repugnant in Helfrich does indeed
exist in the suretyship obligation of the Authority under the Maryland
scheme. A tenable argument can perhaps be made that although the
Authority does guarantee the debts of others, the fatal uncertainty
does not exist. Section 266L of the Act limits the extent of the state's
obligation to thirty million dollars; that is the maximum amount for
which the state can ultimately be liable. The uncertainty therefore pertains only to the amount, below the set maximum, which the state
might actually have to pay in the event of default on any of the guaranteed mortgages. In essence, although the actual amount of the state's
liability is indefinite, the maximum is certain. The weakness of this
argument is apparent in light of the mechanism by which the Authority
is funded should its reserves become insufficient. Although the Act
43. 59 Wash. 2d 216, 367 P.2d 605 (1961).
44. 250 Md. at 617, 243 A.2d at 877.
45. Connecticut, New Hampshire and Vermont have no constitutional limitations
on the state's ability to lend its credit other than public purpose provisions.
46. DEL. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; MAINX CONST. art. IX, § 14-A; R.I. CONST. art.
XXXI, § 1. Plans similar to Maryland's have been uniformly upheld in these states,
the only question being the application of the public purpose doctrine. See, e.g., Opinion
of the Justices, 103 N.H. 258, 169 A.2d 634 (1961).
47. Opinion of the Justices, 54 Del. 366, 177 A.2d 205 (1962) ; Martin v. Maine
Savings Bank, 154 Me. 259, 147 A.2d 131 (1958) ; Opinion of the Justices, 153 Me.
202, 136 A.2d 528 (1957) ; Opinion to the Governor, 88 R.I. 202, 145 A.2d 87 (1958).
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purports to limit the extent of the state's obligation to thirty million
dollars, Section 266Z requires that the state provide funds to support
"'all obligations undertaken by the Authority"4 8 upon the request of
the Authority. The only interpretation of the Act which would resolve
this apparent contradition is that the thirty million dollar maximum
pertains to the state's obligation at any one time, and not to the total
amount of defaulted mortgages which the state might become obliged
to pay during the continued life of the Authority. Conceivably then,
although the total amount of insured mortgages may never exceed the
4 9
maximum, the state might have to pay many times the proscribed limit.
It is arguable that, had the state chosen to fund the mortgage
insurance fund through a donation or loan, incurring no obligation to
provide future funds, the plan would have been insulated by the "special
funds doctrine," that funds devoted to special purposes are immune
from constitutional restrictions. However, the application of this theory
to an industrial development plan, similiar to the Maryland scheme
but not involving continuing appropriations, has been rejected. Button
v. Day5" involved the validity of the Virginia Industrial Building
Authority Act"' which established a revolving fund for the insurance
of mortgages contracted by private industrial concerns. The fund was
created by a "one shot" appropriation with no obligation on the state
to commit future funds. The court, after considering the special funds
doctrine, nevertheless invalidated the act, holding that a state guarantee of loans made by private debtors was, in and of itself, constitutionally prohibited. It seems doubtful that the Helfrich court would
have followed the Button holding under similar conditions, for the
court suggested: "If the State had chosen to borrow the money re48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 266Z(b) (Supp. 1967) (emphasis added).
49. §§ 266Z(a) and (b) can be interpreted in the following manner. The
Authority may increase the size of the mortgage insurance fund reserve by requesting
the Board of Public Works to provide sufficient moneys from its emergency fund.
Since such requests may be made "from time to time," there is no apparent limit to
the amount of funds which may be thus expended. Therefore, although the total
amount of insured mortgages may never exceed thirty million dollars, the Board of
Public Works may have to pay out many times that sum during the life of the
Authority.
Should the Board of Public Works elect not to make payment from its
emergency fund, § 266Z (b) requires that it secure the necessary funds through issuance
of a state loan; the result however, is the same. By the terms of the section the size
of the loan is not determined by the amount requested but must be sufficient to meet
"all obligations undertaken by the Authority," which is assumed to mean the total
value of all outstanding mortgages. The aggregate size of the loan is limited to thirty
million dollars, in conformity with § 266L. But it is hardly apparent in § 266Z(b)
whether the total aggregate amount of all funds secured for the Authority through
state borrowing is limited to that amount. By the terms of the section, the state loan
shall not exceed "in the aggregate the sum of thirty million dollars." Clearly these
words limit the total amount of outstanding bonds; however, should all or a portion
of the bond issue be retired, the Authority could conceivably obtain additional funds
through state borrowing, as long as the level of the outstanding issue does not exceed
the maximum. Therefore, as in the instance of money obtained from the emergency
fund, the state, during the continued life of the Authority, may have to retire more
than thirty million dollars worth of its bonds, and consequently have to pay out a
sum greater than the prescribed maximum.
50. 208 Va. 494, 158 S.E.2d 735 (1968).
51. VA. CODS ANN. §§ 2.1-64.4 to 2.1-64.14 (1968).
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quired, had secured the borrowing by a pledge of its faith and credit,
and had loaned or given the proceeds to the Authority, to be used for
a public purpose, Hopkins would have insulated the transaction from
successful assault."5 2 It must be noted that under such an arrangement
the mortgage guarantee would only be as strong as the size of the
mortgage insurance fund and would thus be less effective than a pledge
of the state's credit in stimulating the flow of private capital at low
interest rates. The total number of mortgages guaranteed under the
act would also be severely limited.
WHEN

IS

OR IN

THE STATE'S CREDIT
AID OF"

AN

"GIVEN,

"INDIVIDUAL

OR LOANED

TO,

ASSOCIATION

OR CORPORATION"?

The credit clause of the Maryland Constitution prohibits the state's

credit from being ". . given, or loaned to, or in aid of any individual
association or corporation. . ."'I Theoretically, at least, a pledge of

credit which does not fall within this language is constitutional. The
clause apparently admits of two distinct interpretations. The first would
construe the phrases "given or loaned to" and "in aid of" to be essentially synonymous and would limit the prohibited class of recipients of
state credit to direct recipients alone. Thus, if the state were to give or
loan its credit to insure payment of a mortgage, and the mortgagor was
not an "individual association or corporation," then the guarantee would
not be invalidated by the credit clause. The second would interpret "in
aid of" to be substantially broader than "given or loaned to" and would
include within the prohibition not only individuals, associations or
corporations receiving state aid directly but also those indirectly benefited by the pledge of credit. For instance, under this interpretation,
although the mortgagor may not be within the prohibited class, if the
mortgagee is an individual, association or corporation, then the guarantee is invalid because the mortgagee, insofar as he is assured of
payment by the guarantee, is aided by the pledge of credit.
The Authority predicated its argument in Helfrich upon the first
interpretation, contending that, under the Act, the state's credit was
pledged to counties and municipalities,54 and that because such recipients are not within the credit clause prohibition, the Act was constitutional. By the terms of the standard agreement between the mortgagor
(county or municipality), mortgagee (private lending institution), and
the Authority, the mortgagor agrees to pay installments of principal
and interest to the mortgagee, and the Authority unconditionally
assures payment of all installments should the mortgagor default. The
state asserted that this suretyship obligation, in substance, supplements the credit of the county or municipality with state credit so that
the requisite funds for industrial development may be obtained without
52. 250 Md. at 615, 243 A.2d at 876.
53. MD.CONST. art. III, § 34.
54. MD. ANN. CODX art. 41, § 266-0(8) (Supp. 1967) defines "mortgagors" as
local development corporations, counties and municipalities. The validity of mortgage
insurance for local development corporations was not at issue in Helfrich.

1968]

M.I.D.F.A. v. HELFRICH

impairment of the county's credit rating, and that, in this sense, the
pledge of credit is "in aid of" counties and municipalities. If this construction of the Act and the credit clause is correct, there is little doubt
that the Act would successfully avoid the credit clause prohibition.
An examination of the proceedings of the Convention of 1850
which drafted the present constitution indicates that it was not the
intention of the delegates to place counties or municipalities within
the ambit of the credit clause. There were at least two proposed drafts
of the credit restriction which would have specifically prohibited the
pledging of the state's credit in aid of political subdivisions. One,
offered by Mr. Ridgely, would have substituted the following: "The
credit of the State shall never be given or loaned in aid of any person,
association, municipality or corporation . . . ."' Another, proposed
by Mr. George, read: "The assent of two-thirds of the members elected
to each branch of the legislature, shall be requisite to every bill appropriating the public money, or pledging the public faith, for local or
private purposes; and the Legislature shall not have the power to niake
appropriations, loans or subscriptions, to any work of internal improvement." 5 6 Both proposals were rejected by the Convention. It
might be noted that the exclusion of this specific restriction is in contrast to other state constitutions
which do prohibit pledges of credit
57
to local governmental units.
In one of the few Maryland decisions to consider the question,
an appropriation of state funds to a county was held not to contravene
Article III, Section 34. Bonsal v. Yellott s involved an annual appropriation of state money to assist counties in the construction of public
roads. The court noted:
"The establishment, construction and maintenance of public roads
is a primary function of government," and when we remember that
a county is but a division of the State, "created and organized
for public political purposes connected with the administration of
the state government," and that the Legislature has, under the
power given it by the Constitution, imposed the duty on the county
commissioners to raise money with which the public roads can be
maintained, it would seem remarkable, if not unjust to the counties,
if the Legislature was intentionally shorn of the power to give such
reasonable aid to the counties towards the construction or improvement of public roads as this act contemplates.59
Helfrich's rebuttal of the Authority's argument, also based on the
more narrow interpretation of the credit clause, was that, in reality,
55. PROCEEDINGS
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CONSTITUrION 315 (1850) (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added).
57. E.g., Ky. CONST. § 177.
58. 100 Md. 481, 60 A. 593 (1905). Bonsai specifically involved the construction

of the "internal improvements" section of the credit clause. It held that state aid to
the construction of highways by the counties did not constitute involvement in prohibited "internal improvements."

59. Id. at 507, 60 A. at 597.
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the counties and municipalities are only straw mortgagors, and that
the real mortgagors, and thus the direct recipients of the state's credit,
are the industrial lessees.6" Under this interpretation, the Act would
clearly violate the credit clause. The mortgage is, in practice, amortized
by the lessee's rental payments. Thus the liability of the municipality
or county under the mortgage is contingent upon the financial condition of the lessee. The state purportedly guarantees the mortgage of
the county or municipality, but since, by the terms of the Act, the
county or municipality is prohibited from pledging its own credit in
support of the mortgage6 ' and in no way can be held to make mortgage payments should the lessee default in its rental payments, the
state's liability is ultimately contingent upon the lessee. In addition,
the common leasing arrangement under the Act provides that the industrial site may be conveyed to the lessee for nominal consideration
upon expiration of the lease.6" Several federal tax cases,63 cited by
Helfrich in his brief, have viewed similar leasing arrangements as sales,
even though they purported to be leases.
The Helfrich court neither accepted nor rejected the arguments
offered by the parties but held instead that ". . . the State's credit,
if pledged to guarantee a mortgage, clearly has been 'given . .. in aid
of . .. [a] corporation . .. ' "64 Apparently then, the court adopted

the broader interpretation of the "in aid of" provision and looked not
only to the direct recipients of the pledge of credit but to those parties
who benefited from it, reasoning that since the mortgagee "benefits"
from the guarantee of payment and since mortgagees are normally
private corporations, the guarantee must come within the credit clause
prohibition. The question remains, however, to what extent the
"benefit" criterion may be applied. If the mortgagee had not in fact
been an "individual association or corporation," then the court would
probably have had to consider the relative merits of the arguments
of the Authority and Helfrich. Arguably, however, the industrial lessee
under the Act also benefits from the pledge of credit, and this alone,
under the indirect benefit standard implied by the court, would be
sufficient to bring the Act within the credit clause. Thus it seems that
the effect of the adoption of a broad interpretation of the clause is to
preclude any industrial aid plan involving a pledge of the state's credit.
CONCLUSION

Because the method of encouraging industrialization contemplated
by the Act is totally dependent upon the effect of a pledge of state
credit on a county's or municipality's ability to secure inexpensive
60. Brief for Appellee & Cross-appellant at 11-13, Md. Indus. Dev. Financing
Authority v. Helfrich, 250 Md. 602, 243 A.2d 869 (1968).
61. MD. ANN. CODx art. 41, § 266W(a) (Supp. 1967).
62. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
63. Haggard v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir., 1956); Oesterreich v.
Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir., 1955) ; Gleis v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 941,
aff'd, 245 F.2d 237 (6th Cir., 1957).
64. 250 Md. at 617, 243 A.2d at 877.

19681

M.I.D.F.A. v. HELFRICH

mortgage loans, it is apparent that the decision in Helfrich has emasculated the plan. The fact that a constitutional proscription can so defeat
what is certainly a dynamic concept of state industrial assistance raises
the question of whether the protection of the credit clause still serves
a useful purpose or only frustrates the ever-expanding functions of
local governments.
It may be persuasively argued that the constitutional restrictions
upon pledges of credit were imposed in response to the rather specialized
problems of the mid-nineteenth century and that the increasing activities
of state governments should not be restrained by limitations calculated
as safeguards against the evils of the railroad bond era."5 As the
Hopkins court observed:
The unquestionable historical reason for the proposal of the

constitutional section ...

was to curb the reckless and improvident

investment of public funds in aid of railroads and canals ...
That was the evil that had impaired or threatened the credit of
these and other states, and that was the evil primarily in the
minds of the framers of our constitution of a hundred years ago.
Whatever they said in that instrument must be considered in the
light of what they were trying to prevent in the future. Now, a
century later, we must decide whether, by what they then said,
they foreclosed something which was not and could not have been
envisioned by them, and which had no relation whatever to the
problems they were facing.6
The argument that such protection is no longer needed is predicated upon the assumption that the public purpose doctrine in its
present judicial stature provides adequate protection against abusive
expenditures and loans of public credit.67 Conversely, it seems relevant
that modern plans for the encouragement of industrial growth bear a
marked similarity to the programs which sought to assist the development of railroads and canals, and it is apparent that the broad interpretation of the public purpose doctrine applied by some courts affords
65. See note 30 supra.
66. 199 Md. at 398, 86 A.2d at 900.
67. The recently defeated proposed Maryland Constitution would have removed
all constitutional limitations on the state's use of its credit except the public purpose
test. PROPOSgD MD. CoNST. § 6.01 would apply to the state's borrowing powers:
The State shall have the power to incur indebtedness for any public purpose
in the manner and upon the terms and conditions as the General Assembly may
prescribe by law. All such indebtedness shall be secured by an irrevocable pledge
of the full faith and credit and unlimited taxing power of the State. Unless the
law authorizing the creation of an obligation includes such an irrevocable pledge,
the obligation shall not be considered an indebtedness of the State.
PROPOSED MD. CONST. § 6.02 would require that all grants, loans and pledges of credit
(involving suretyship obligations) be only for a public purpose, and approved by a
three-fifths majority of the legislature:
The assets or credit of the State shall not in any manner be given or loaned
to any individual, association, or corporation unless a public purpose will be
served thereby and unless authorized by an act of the General Assembly stating
the public purpose and, in the case of a gift or loan of credit or a loan of assets,
passed by the affirmative vote of three-fifths of all the members of each house.
RZPORT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION 222, 224 (1967).
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protection only against flagrant abuses of governmental discretion.
The language in Borough of Paramus v. County of Bergen"8 is illustrative of this judicial outlook: "The wisdom of making public improvements is not a matter for judicial investigation, and the courts
will not intervene in the proceedings to bring about a public improvement in the absence of fraud or patent illegality.""9
From the decisions in McKean and Helfrich it appears that, if
industrial development in Maryland is to be assisted by a program
which contemplates the pledging of the state's credit, the constitutional
restrictions of Article III must be overcome. Assuming that the best
framework would be one which is more permissive to the endeavors
of the state and local governments than the existing constitutional
prohibition, yet which would afford greater protection than a complete
reliance on the public purpose doctrine, two solutions appear possible.
The first would require constitutional revision. Under such a scheme,
the credit clause would be repealed and rewritten in a manner which
reflects current needs and experiences and incorporates necessary protections. The feasibility of such an approach, however, appears limited.
In addition to the obvious political difficulties attendant to constitutional
change, there exists the probability that, in light of the increasing
demands on local governments for social and economic involvement,
provisions appropriate today may be inadequate two decades hence.
The second solution seems more practical and is currently being
tested in various degrees. This approach would place the burden of
providing safeguards upon the legislature or the electorate, which would
consider the merits of any proposed industrial development scheme.
In addition, an administrative body would oversee the functioning of
any adopted program and judge by predetermined standards the
efficacy of individual projects. Forms of this basic scheme have been
enacted in several states. Two states which have no constitutional
credit restrictions have enacted industrial aid plans which incorporate
built-in checks against improvident projects. New Hampshire's legislation provides that the industrial authority shall submit for approval
a detailed and descriptive report of all proposed projects to the governor
and council who will determine whether a particular guarantee would
be in conformity with the purposes of the act.
Connecticut provides
that all applications for insurance be forwarded to either a development credit corporation, a public instrumentality, or a three member
board, composed of members experienced in industrial financing, who
conduct a detailed investigation to be used in assessing the merits of
the project.7 1 Other states allow for exception to the credit clause
when certain constitutional requirements are met. Rhode Island requires, by constitutional amendment,12 that any proposed state debt
or pledge of credit be approved by a majority of the popular vote.
68. 25 N.J. 492, 137 A.2d 425 (1958).
69. 137 A.2d at 427.

70. N.H. RAV. STAT. ANN. § 162-A:14-b (1964).
71. CONN. GXN. STAT. ANN. § 32-15 (Supp. 1968).

72. R.I. CONST. amend. 31, § 1.
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Delaware places the responsibility of preliminary judgment upon the
legislature, requiring a three-quarter majority vote for enactment of
any program involving the creation of a state debt or pledge of the
state's credit.78
Perhaps the optimum balance between freedom to assist the
economic development of the state and absolute prohibition would
involve a combination of the plans of these four states. Under such a
hybrid scheme, Maryland's credit clause might be amended to provide
for exceptions when certain constitutional requirements are met. Also,
future industrial development plans could require review of each project
by an independent legislative or executive body of experts.
73.

Din.. CONsT. art VIII, § 4.

